Towards a philosophy of gerontology, version 8
1.Introduction.
2.Fundamental gerontological considerations on aging.
2.0.Definition of senescence.
2.1.On the process of senescence.
2.3.The forms of the pressure of time.
2.4. Explanatory-theoretic aspects of senescence.
3. Philosophical thoughts on the explanation of aging.
4. Towards eradication of aging: a philosophical strategy.
1.Introduction: An atempt to mediate a deeper compatibility between Philosophy and Gerontology
What is philosophy in general, or what is the specific of philosophy? For Aristotel, philosophy is the knowledge of the first principles and causes - those supreme principles which explain the whole existence(Coltescu, 2002 p.160 ). For Kant, philosophy is knowledge by concepts; or the search of the limits of our cognitive capacities. For Hegel, philosophy is the rational knowledge of absolute. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is the activity of eludation of thoughts. For analitical philosophers, philosophy is the analysis of scientific language or of common language. For Heidegger, philosophy is the existential analytics , that is investigating of those modes of being that are proper to human existent(Dasein);
For Frankfurt school representatives (Marcuse), philosophy is the critical theory of modern society and of forms of reification and human alienation in the background of this society. Coltescu considered that 'In its esence, philosophy is this reflection, this meditation by which we want to understand, to distinguish the sense of world and of our proper existence---and by understanding, to liberate us, to conquer our spiritual autonomy'(Coltescu 2002, p.21). Most philosophers had considered that philosophy is a knowledge, differences appear either concerning its object( first principles, the absolute, the universal etc.) or its method (by concepts to Kant) or its faculty(reason, senses etc). But, is philosophy limited just to a form of contemplative knowledge disinterested from a practical or applicative point of view? Tudosescu considers that'only in limits in which it conditionate value reedifications at the level of other forms of social conscience and, respective, modifications in the structure of the tables of cultural values, so that these to stimulate changes whith deep character in the structure and dynamics of civilizations, we can say that philosophy have an applicative character'(Tudosescu 1997, p.169). Someones had emphasized the propensity towards universality, the tendency to cover the whole reality: philosophy is a general conception about the world; it tries to discern the most general determinations of reality, that is of nature, society and thinking. But, neither thought is an universal characteristic of univers nor society. The most general determinations of world concern either the fundamental-necessary level of reality, substance, microphysics level, or some characteristics of the univers as a whole, like evolution or cosmic becoming. Others considered that, philosophy studies existence in its totality . But Beaufret have written about Wollf:'Wollf is proposing for himself therefore to make the census of essentialias, that is of all that it can be said about being as being. This science is, by consequence, the science of being as posibility.One can talk about being without to say a word about its existence. The last is just a 'complementum posibilitatis', a complement of posibility.'(Beaufret 1998, p.11). On the other hand, there are special philosophies, as ethics or ethical philosophy, which are quasi-disinterested about some ontic or ontological aspects of reality. There is some autonomy between some philosophical disciplines, such as there is a certain freedom in human life. An alternative characterization of philosophy concerns its aims. Thus, for Rescher the characteristic aims of philosophy are: (i) Provide answers to those domain definitive questions, that is, propound and comunicate information that conveys these answers . ( We want answers.) (ii) Seek for cogency, that is, fit those answers out with a rationale that attains cogency and conviction by way of evidentiation, substantiation, and demonstration. (We want not just answers but answers worthy of acceptance.) (iii) Strive for rational economy, pursuing the tasks at issue in points (i) and (ii) in a way that is rationally satisfacatory, that is, in an efficient, effective, economical
The general characterization problem of philosophy relative to its particular domains or of its specific relative to other cultural forms---art, religion, science---is a metaphilosophical one. But, how it can be justified this diversity of opinions about the esence of philosophy? Coltescu had considered that: 'The two levels of philosophy, [first-order philosophy and metaphilosophy] are in interaction, are situated in a circularity raport, the thinkers options in the plane of proper philosophy having effects on their metaphilosophical conceptions and, converse, their metaphilosophical conceptions influence their investigations in the plane of proper philosohy.'(Coltescu, 2002, p.18-19).
About the antireduction of philosophy, science, mind and imortality
Like Vacariu et al (2001, p.275), I consider that the previous characterizations are partly correct but they concern philosophy from a single perspective, sometimes from a reductionist point of view. They can be considered as quasi-complementary. However, previous characterizations, either in particular or taken all together simultaneouslly, do not succed to surprise all that was, all that is, all that will be, all that can be philosophy. But, until to what limits can be philosophy extended and developed? What is philosophy? Or, can be it unificated? If an unification by reduction at one of the previous characterizations is inacceptable, still remain a posibility of unification not by reduction but by an ultimate persistent aim, ideal. I will ilustrate this with an example from philosophy of science. Popper considered that truth is the regulative ideal of science, and in this sense truth may have an unificatory role, relative to various special sciences, as a common aim, ideal, tack toward all the scientific propensities converge. But, truth single maybe is a too strong criterion of scientificity and is not enough as an ideal of science, because the common statements as 'the sun is brilliant' are not veritable scientific statements, because they are too common-truths. More constrains are needed. In addition, science should to pursue also sistematic explanation, the laws and the freedom grades of universe at all its levels, from microcosmos to individual human conscience, society and macrocosmos.
Against antistructural reductionism
Fetzer assume that science aims at the discovery of laws of nature that have the form of general principles that are applicabile for the purposes of explanation and prediction. On the other hand, science should not to prefere simplicity and economy necessarly. Simpler theories ought to be prefered to complex alternatives only in the cases in wich they are also adequate, truth. I addition, we do not know a priori that reality is simple. Other think that, science tend towards unity(cf. Gold and Stoljar, 1999). However, science should to pursue unity only in the case in wich world is realy unitary. But, we do not know a priori that universe have an ultimate universal unity. This aims are preferable but they are contingent aims, thereby they have a contingent scientific value. Maybe, the universe have a fundamental ontological level wich have a necessary existence, and consequently is universal, for/in every posible world, but the universe unity should not be identified with the unity of science. The unity of universe exist at the fundamental ontological level, but the unity of human science is at the level of human conscious level. The human consciousness is something that exist at an upper ontological level, that depend on a more complex level of organization. If the 'elementary particles' are not elementary, if there exist an ultimate unique-type-of-ontological-primitive, however, 'organization is a property wich cannot be reduced to the properties of its parts, for the behavior of each part depends on those of the others and on the aims of the whole.'(Del Re, 1998). By previous phrase I have not intentioned to defend the autonomy of chemistry, biology or of psychology against microphysics's imperialism. I only intended to criticize the tendency to reduce all the emergent properties of systems with complex organization to the sums of the properties of their microparts. I disageed whith idea that all the phenomena from superior organizational complexity levels supervene as simple sums of the phenomena from lower levels.
The superior cognitive capacities of human brain are absent at the single neuron level, that is neurons are not small brains. Brain is not a big neuron.
For exemple, if we take two thousand of resistors and we try to connect them in all posibile structures, we know that there is only one unnecessary structure, wich is total serial, in wich the total resistance, the phenomenon from higher level, is the sum of the resistance of each resistor, or the sum of the properties of phenomena from the lower level, but in structures that involve parallel conected resistors, the total resistance is not a simple sum of the resistance of individual resistors. The property that is comon both to the higher level and to the lower level is 'resistitivity'.
And, in the non-serial resistors corpus the difference in the total resistance is thanks to structure. However, this resistor corpus have a aditive property, a property that is only the sum of the properties of parts: its mass. Only its mass do not depend on its structure. But, the previous exemple concern a set of objects that are of the same kind. If we add to resistors also condensators, transistors and other parts, and try to erect a computer, than the properties of computer will be only the sum of the properties of its parts? How will we add resistivity with condensativity?
An other argument antireductionist in spirit, comming from cognitive neuroscience, is that of Quartz and Sejnowski concerning how develop mind.
They present to paradigms that try to explain the development of mind:
'For selectionism, then, development marks a reduction in representational complexity. In contrast, neural constructivism sees development as a progressive increase in representational complexity.' (Quartz, S. & Sejnowski, T.J., 1997).
With regard to the measure of the representational complexity, they present three main candidates :synaptic numbers, axonal arborization, and dendritic arborization.
And, with many empirical evidences(e.g., Bourgeois et al. 1994) they show that there is no in the temporal interval of development a change(a sudenlly eliminatory selectivity as pretend selectionism) wich sustain selectionism, on the contrary they argue for neural constructivism, that is for development as an increase in complexity. And, this is not in favour of simplicity.
However, I think that the developmental properties of mind should to depend also on the synaptic spatial distribution, not only on the synaptic number.
In addition, there are writers, like van den Bos, wich propose a framework for animals consciousness study wich is based on a hierarchical organizational feedback model of central nervous system. van den Bos defined consciousness' as a property of neural networks of self-organizing systems dedicated to dealing with rapidly changing environments affording flexibility in behavioral patterning'([van den Bos, 2000]). He consider that:
the brain structures form a functional unit.
the mental states have two parts:one invariant(wich is open to study in relation with species' Umwelt) and one variant.
the specific contents of a mental state at a particular time point is dependent on momentarily active neural connections within the specific network and on the information encoded in these connections.
the encoded information is formed by the specific input (through sensory organs) and output (the movements that are made) relationship in the hierarchical sistem.
On the other hand, between the neuronal level and the neuronal network level there is a difference that is partial analogous with that wich there is between the atomic level and the molecular level, or between the macromolecular level and the celular level, or between celular and tisular levels . If thinking there is only at the conscious level, and the consciousness is a property of a network wich is situated at a superior level of a hierarchy, then thinking and animals consciousness cannot be reduced/limited at properties of a singular neuron, as must to pretend the neuron doctrine.The correct tendency of present is to recognize that there is a dependency between organization of conscience of animals and the organization of brain. On the other hand, the posible relationships and comunications between neurons depend also on the properties of neurons. But, the properties of interactions between sets of special organized neurons, depend also on the global properties of those sets, wich depend partial on the specific organization of those sets, and on the other influences from CNS. Thus, properties of neurons plus the quantity (the number) of neurons determine a big set of posible CNSs, as the set of the CNSs of mamals. From all posible CNSs, the environment [competition, the fight for survival or/and reproduction, the capacity of problem solving even by deceptive conditioning] have selected some. But, the properties of neurons, when there are more than one neuron, cannot determine only one type of special organization of CNS, but only a non-diferentiated set of posibilities, or the general laws of the organization of any posible CNS, wich permit the existence of a great number of different special organizations of CNS. And, if we consider the superior cognitive emergent properties of an individual CNS, like that of human, I think that, we will realize that the properties of its single neurons form in the explanation of those superior cognitive properties only the necesary conditions--- with the same neurons may be constructed other different CNSs--- and that for the explanation of the specific or individual properties of a CNS we have to consider also its organization, structure, functioning, wich form in its explanation a sufficient condition. On the other hand, there exist aditive properties, as would be the physical mass of brain, wich do not depend on the arrangement of the parts of the whole. Thus, at different levels of organizational and functional complexity there are emergent properties wich cannot be founded at certain too lower levels and wich are not just simple sums of the phenomena from wich they supervene. For exemple, chemists, at least Del Re, admit the ireducibility of higher levels properties (like, the global properties of cells) to the lower level properties---by ireducibility I intended to say that a cell is not just a quantity of molecules or macromolecules---in the folowing way:
a molecule is a collection of nuclei and electrons.
the way in wich are put together nuclei and electrons matter, and the connections (chemical bonds or microforce fields) determine the properties of the whole.
a complete description of the electrons and nuclei wich form the parts of a molecule is not a complet description of an individual molecule, because the whole reality of a molecule include also emergent properties.
the properties of nuclei and electrons and their numerical cantity, the constrains of universal environment plus the contextual constrains, determine all the type of intramolecular connections and molecular arrangements.
the particular arrangement of nuclei and electrons in a molecular structure tend to satisfy the actions of force fields.
but the non-additive properties of a molecule as a whole depend also on its specific molecular structure, and they neither can be finded at level of the properties of nucleus, neither are unique determinated by the the properties of the nuclei or of the electrons.
a cell, is what it is, not because it would correspond to a metastable configuration of atoms and electrons by wich it is constituted, but because its coordinated activity (entelehy) is finalized, aimed at holding it alive in a particular (normal) state.
Del Re considers that, for a complet description of an entity wich appear as unitary at a certain level, we must to describe the collection of all the previous levels wich appear in a hierarchy of an organizational and functional complexity, and that at each previous level the information about the considered object is partial latent and indeterminated. In evolutionary psychology it is considered that human mind is the result of a modular organization of brain; the modules of brain have multiple specialized functions like: receptive functions, motor functions, or for the formation and the criticise of beliefs; and these modules are interconnected. However, this modular view is criticized by neural constructivism. All these (the hierarchy, modularity or networks properties) tend to falsify the thesis that human mind or the integral consciousness animal experience can be reduced, or can be the product of a single neuron, untill to the level of the singular neuron, as must to pretend the neuron doctrine. Maybe, neuron can be an unity of NS, but cannot be an unity of conscious states. Two man with the same number of synapses and with the same number of neurons can differ in their mental properties, due to synaptic spatial distribution. Political sciences do not treats about the properties of elementary particles, but unity must be, however, a comm-unity of the particular sciences and a specific unity of science, not a hierarchy of levels of existence or a history of molecular evolution from elementary particles and forces to the human society. However, systematization and clasification of sciences are values from a rational point of view(Hintikka and Halonen, 1999).
The unity of science should be an unity not of all the levels of material organization, but an unity of all the scientific products. Given the great diversity of domains of sciences and scientific products, a content unity is less expectable. On the other hand, the scientific progress can change the unity of science whith time. Therefore, an regulative ideal/ideals as unity of science is good.
As a kind of conclusion to antistructural ontology
Human brain is a concretmaterialisation of an ontologically posible system.
The set of all the posible systems and structures depend on the properties of ontological primitive/primitives, on their numerical quantity, on the trans-contextual conditions and on the specific contextual conditions.
The properties of the wholes depend on the properties of ontological primitives, on the quantity of the ontogical primitives that constitue them, on their structures; there exist emergent properties.
An ontologically posible mind is not a product of human brain, but it is a human discovery.
The posible minds, the properties of ontological primitive/primitives, the laws of univers, are not products of human mind;their existence is not conditionated by humans; humans cannot exist if they would not exist; they had existed before the life apparition and can to exist if life would no longer exist.
The ontological posibility of human brain is implicated by the properties of ontological primitive/primitives, by their sufficient quantity and by some specific contextual conditions.
What is physically posible do not depend at all on the imagination of brain, but only on the universal and local physical constraints.
Implementation of a certain ontologically posible mind may be not independent of human brain, but what is ontologically posible in every context in space and time will never depend on human brain, maybe.
Question: What is the necessary level of univers? Is there something indestructible in Univers?
We can to conceive the whole space being empty.
But, we cannot to imagine something aspatial.
Is there something more primitive than the empty space in univers?
Is there something that would can affect the space itself?
The matter density in some region of space can increase and decrease, but the space itself cannot be destructed?
Now, considered etimologicaly, philosophy have the sense of love of wisdom. In an analog way, we can consider that the eternal regulative ideal of philosophy is wisdom. We saw that initial it was considered that wisdom involve the knowledge of being, but then appeared an enrichment, preoccupation for the knowledge of becoming, then for the knowledge of humanity, then for the knowledge of the limits of the pure reason, and so on. The history of philosophy reveal that the term philosophy have a dynamical intension and extension. What would should to justify the inclusion or exclusion of certain conditions to the conceptual sense of philosophy is their consistency with its final ideal: wisdom. This historical development and enrichment of intension and extension of the love of wisdom make us to anticipate that wisdom is an ideal toward we tend and/or progress, not a something present wich we would need just to analize, like brain. I think that, brain itself is nothing more than an mean wich participate, by its cognitive/scientific development, at the realization of this ideal result, and in conditions in wich its functions or capacities can be multiple implementable, brain is not the only mean or the necessary condition, the posibility condition of wisdom. If those capacities of brain (like control of movement, stimulus reception and codification, information processing, imagination, problem solving) are reproductible by robots, then the neuronal level is not a necessary condition for the posibility of mind.
The necessary and universal characteristics of whatever posible mind are a set of capacities wich can be implementated by architectures wich can be different both at the organizational-cauzal level(the same capacity can supervene on different structures that do not simulate brain arhitecture) and at the implementational level.
As Block said, 'it can be implementated mecanicaly, electricaly, biologicaly.'
Brain is specialized in realization of certain function/functions like:
sensory functions:
(a) reception, codification and processing of the light quanta flow, in the limits of some frequencies.
(b) reception, codification, processing of acustic/air pertubations, in some limits.
(c) reception, codification, processing of the stimulus coming from the interaction with macrobjects.
motor functions:
for the reglation of movements:
(a) for movement preparation.
(b) for the movement in the external environment.
(c) for the internal motions adjustment (as the motions of heart, etc.)
for the codificated store of informations/contents.
for the abstract processing of information.
for reasoning.
But, the function or the ultimate utility of all this functions and subsystems of the brain-system is only one: survival and optimization of conditions of life; to maximize the quantity and quality of life;or the preservation and the improvement of life. A beter visual system can help an animal to resolve some vital problems. But, the accuteness of human vision is inferior whith regard to the vision accuteness of other animal visual system. Humans are superior to all animals with respect to reasoning and abstract processing of information/content. In the case of a conscious authonomous robot this final function or mission would can be conservation of its integrity, information I think that, feelings have an unconscious very important role in animals motivation. The feelings of pain and pleasure have a fundamental role in the motivation of animals. If animals would not feel pain when are damaged, how much time would they survive? If they would not feel the feeling of hungry, if they would not feel any pleasure in their life, would survive
they sufficient time to reproduce theirself? That is why a robot which would have the capacity of feeling pain when is damaged would much resemble whith animals, in its behaviour. On the other hand, feelings neither are necessary for survival, nor are necessary for presevation of the integrity of a robot. The capacity of abstract processing of information(coming from other sensorial systems) and the capacity of reasoning can also realize the role or the utlity of feelings. A robot can be programated to have an ultimate mission and to use all its cogntive powers to realize it. But in this case its freedom would be only relativeto means. Bones, muscles, brains have as an ultimate utility or mission to solve the preservation and optimization of life problem?
We can conceive for every neuronal network of brain an artificial network wich is superior both in quantity of its components and in its structural-functional, organizational properties, that is in its performance. What is essential is the final utility, the set of actual structures and the actual capacities maybe is not the best one. Can we conceive superior alternative capacities of mind? Is the abstract principles of life multiple concretizable? If the first person level of an individual human can supervene on different material implementations, if its long therm memory would can be transferred, then the problem of imortality is multiple solvable. However, here I had made a grave, but, unconscious intended eror. Suppose that we would have the power to double usself. So as, linings would do not differ qualitatively. Would this mean that if we would die but our lining would survive, we had not die? No!
Two atoms of hidrogen are not composed by the same elementary particles, but only by the same type of elementary particles. I attracted the attention on the fact that two things cannot be identical in the summer of 2003, when one of my anemies(Stefanescu Adina.), reactively to my thesis suggested something about the Harnad's indiscernability.
Now, what is more important Cognitive Science or Gerontology? What is more mean and what is more aim?
For humans gerontology is more important than creation of robots. Robots should to serve humans. That is why my fundamental idea is:
Two objects never can be absolute identical, indifferently how many properties they share, because they are TWO(quantitatively).
When I presented first time, in a primitive version, Towards a Philosophy of gerontology, some of my anemies tried to extend in mases hate against me by suggesting the feeling that my speech is against procreation.
When I refered to one of them, in my previous version, next day, some local political voices suggested indirectly that 'some' do not listed the good things that had been maded locally and that are a danger for the national interests! To be local politicians so interested of philosophy? Or had been they helped by some friends to see my works?
This kind of deceptive and manipulative behaviour is present in all the countries of the world and its agents are a danger for the eternal interests of humanity. Maybe, at the top of the political level are not those who deserve to be there, but those who are the best in deceptive and manipulative inteligence.
Short digression
A manipulative person can inhibit a person X behaviour(by fear), by exciting the hate of a mas Y, by giving an ethicaly negative misinterpretation of X's behaviour. To be more eficient, the manipulative person can give an antinational or antihuman interpretation of X's behaviour. Every human action can be antinational or antihuman misinterpreted by those who have a deceptive and manipulative retoric. The deceptively-manipulative person can prepare the mases to be very agressive at some point of time, progressively. It can progress until the idea that is more better to die one single person than a nation. Jesus!
Or if two person are in competition for something, one of them, the deceptive one can try to suggest to mases that its competitor have some familiar duty and is more better for it to stay home or something. Or, to inhibe the progress of its competitor a deceptive person rob its competitor intimate journal from its naive adolescence and treath him with its publicity.That is, the deceptive persons use even ethics to misinterpret and deceptively manipulate humans. A little nation can be
affected(e.g., robed) by a more powerful nation. A religious representative can give the folowing 'explanation': 'this was permitted by god, due the decrease of faith in the first nation'. A political leader can provide this teleological explanation:'this to punish the antidemocratic politics [practiced by the little nation] and to stimulate religious faith increase'. If it is not truth, however, will be preventive.
That is why every wrong action can be deceptively sanctified.
Or, another, a media agency present at the place of an interbinational conflict select and transmit to other nations only those news that are in the favour of one part and is for the destruction of other one; and all this in function of offers. All is negociable, even the right to kill.
At least some political actions are the sublime expression of the most barbarian will. And this posibilities can be infinitely diversified, developed and mixed function of requests and offers. With regard to this type of man, 'we will never survive unless'
You do not think that this persons should be detected, discredited and eradicated from leadership?
Reflection on the idea of nothing and its relevance for science and humanity
On the reference of the idea of nothing
It seems to me that there can be no absolute nothing.
Arguments:
an idea is not nothing; indeed, every posible cognitive system is material and, therefore, is a function of matter; it is something material: as a material state of a material system; therefore, until we have any idea, the absolute nothing cannot be.
on the other hand, if the quantity of energy from universe is constant, that is, if energy cannot be destroyed, but only transformed from a state in an another state, than outer nothing cannot be, therefore absolute nothing cannot be, that is nothing both inside and outside, cannot be. If the empty space is indestructible, than the same it holds.
On the content of the idea of nothing
By our experience of relative nothing(e.g., an empty box or by the experince of relative destruction) we can arrive, by mental operations, at the idea of absolute nothing, by extension. Or by thinking at a continuously reduction of a cognitive content of an idea(e.g., we can arrive until the idea of 0). As we can arrive at the idea of infinitThat is, by increasing continuously somehow a cognitive content.
But, any idea in order to be understooded should to have a content. Thus, idea of nothing cannot be understooded without starting or relating it with something positive content. 0 is understooded relative to quantity. The empty can be understooded only relative to matter or physical and space.
That is why, the idea of nothing have, however, a contentit is not merely negation, in addition is the negation of all that is .
On the other hand, we must to understand that the idea of nothing is something material, is a material state of a material system.
Only together with a positive content this idea is inteligible.
~ single have not any meaning.
Even single, ~ have a content, although not a meaningful content.
Therefore, the idea of nothing does not involve an ideatic nothing.
However, we can think somehow at the idea of absolute nothing positive content, but this idea is not content-empty. We can anticipate the idea of absolute nothing, but we cannot arrive to it
My fundamental idea is that
there can be no an absolute empty-content idea
But, content can to come from many sensorial systems, not only from visual system.
And, many animals have sensorial contents.
I think that, there are animals with better senses than humans
That is why mental opertations/processings/computations
are very important.
As was argued by Quartz and Sejnowsky in The neural basis of cognitive development , evolution of cognition lead to a more flexible capacity of forming free representationbut, as they argue, development also involve an increase of the complexity of representationsnot a reduction to nothing
Therefore, a depeer understanding of everithing involve more logical/scientific/rational coherence of all that is from bottom to top.
The nothing cannot increase the inteligibility of science. I fear that idea of nothing is a sterile one.
Metaphysics=chemistry.
Metachemistry=biology.
Neither science nor animal cognition, evolutionarily speaking, do not begin with the nothing-content, but with some content, at least a sensorial content.
We do not start from nothing-content, but we anticipate this idea starting from some content.
More than simplity we want inteligibility, and this involve not only isolates primitives, but also relations, structures, processes etc.
We should to arrive not to the idea of nothing, but to the coherence of the whole existenceto the understanding of all that is. And this is not thanks to the idea of nothing.
Humans and the whole existence will never participate toward idea of nothing.
Neither had we started, nor we should to arrive at the idea of nothing.
We should to arrive at the understandig of all that is, all that was, all that will be and finally to understanding all that can be and all that cannot be; to an ultimate but coherent understanding of all and to the discovery of those posibities that will make we happy. Not to nothing.
Neither simplity nor economy is our ultimate and necessary scientific and philosophical aims. By science we want primarly understanding and secondly happiness. The lather involve extension of life quantity and quality. The lather involve justice& love&peace&freedom&power and maybe others.
Towards a unification by aim
We observe that, at the same time with the extension of science, art and culture domains it is posible the extension of domains of philosophy, for exemple apparition of philosophy of gerontology. However, the enrichment of the content of the term philosophy may be initiated even from the inside of philosophy itself. The progress in philosophy can result in multiple ways:
by development of some ancient fundamental questions and answers.
by abandonment of some theses, directions wich had been proved untrue, inexacte or improper.
by addition of new topics supervened by philosophic intuition and reflection.
And, may be, every domain of reality or even the posibility can to become an object for philosophical reflection, but much more those themes wich are more compatible with its fundamental philosophycal ideal: wisdom. Reasoning thinking, and its forms, is the necesary condition of human wisdom, but it is not enough. What it can be wisdom? Or, at least, in great lines, with what it is incompatible? Wisdom cannot mean ignorance, therefore it is compatible with cognition. However, wisdom cannot mean any knowledge: philosophy is not identical neither with science, nor with religion or art. And, some proper objects for cognitive philosophy, had been showed before . On the other hand, wisdom cannot mean insuficient inteligence, therefore it must involve also inteligence. In absolute, inteligence involve the capacity of solving problems, indifferent of their importance or values for humans. But, in addition, wisdom should to involve also the evaluation of the fundamental function or pragmatic utility of inteligence in acord with the fundamental needs of biobeings. Thus, wisdom is compatibile with the conscious attempt to resolve the folowing problems:
survival; adaptation have a value only as a mean to survival, not an absolute value; sometimes is more wiser the adaptation of univers to the needs of humans.
optimization of life conditions.
extension of life span.
eradication of senescence, if it will be posible.
and progressing in this sense we tend towards an ideal limit: imortality and happiness.
In addition to inteligence, wisdom must to involve the capacity of correct appreciation of the possesor most important aims, for long term. I propose the folowing measure law , as a potential biouniversal law of wisdom:
The wisdom of creatures, either at individual level or at species level, is directly proportional to the quantity, quality and the balance between quantity and quality of their life in the history of univers; however, considering the dificulty of their contextual conditions of life.
This law is well-grounded on a supposition and appreciation of what is and what should to be the final aims of all creatures[continuously survival, conservation and development of life].
For 3,x miliards of years, the final sense or utility of most body-environment interactions either conscious or unconscious, of knowledge, of the navigation within environment, of the political organizations and actions was the increase of the quantity and the quality of life, at least for actor. By quality of life I mean all the good mental pleasures(like those related to freedom, justice, cognition, love, non-deceptive pleasures etc.) . I think that philosophy neither is deceptive inteligence nor is manipulative inteligence. Wisdom is consistent with justice, but all the humans in world try to impose theirself by every imoral means. Everyone aspire to manipulate human mases. For most of humans wisdom is relative to the power to gain many. Many is the ultimate ethics of most humans.
Now, previous considerations(the good ones) can function as alternative conditions wich enrich the conceptual sense of philosophy term. Or, they can subsume the alternative conditions. If mankind would be suddenly threatened by a natural disaster, as a collision with an celestial body or by a new glacial era, all the human knowledge would be utilized as a mean to solving the problem/aim of survival and unlimited conservation of life. In relation with the other body parts, brain have a role of control, orientation, problems(like survival, reproduction and other involved by happiness) solving, but in relation with life is only a mean; the mental life of brain depend on the life, the state and the functional relation between its (neuronal, glial)cells; and survival and conservation of other body parts cells depend, at least in part, on the brain inteligence; there is an interdependence here. Human mind have as fundamental tack, or,
the 'spirit' or the' finality' of brain is the conservation and the optimization of life.
From this perspective, of maximal extension of the quantity of life and in an non-suficient measure of its quality, I wish to draw atention on the importance, because it is compatibile with the biouniversal wisdom law, of gerontology, and to the posibility of a philosophy of gerontology.
2. Fundamental gerontological considerations on aging
In what it will folow, I want to present a minimal consideration on some important aspects of gerontolgy.
2.1. Definition of senescence
Eremia consider that, 'senescence is apparently the spontaneous process of progressively deterioration of life structures, released at the molecular level, starting with the first moment of this structures and having as result the permanent reduction of biological performances, as well as the increase of the risk of life cesation as a result of all environmental aggressions kinds'.([Eremia, p.38])
2.2. On the process of senescence
Strehler divide the processes of senescence in two categories:
determinated , by wich he understand that part of any senescent process wich is geneticaly determinated.
and, subsidiary, related to the aggressions efects wich appear in the frame of the interactions between body and environment.
Most gerontologists (cf. Eremia) consider that a process is senescent when it fulfil the folowing four fundamental conditions:
universality: all the members of species must to be affected by it with time.
progressivity: wich suppose that the lesions wich are at base of senescence are acumulated with time; the affection of a macromolecule is spontaneous, but accumulation of this lesions it is produced gradualy and, therefore, progressively, regressively.
to be intrinsic: are excluded those lesions wich come from external causes as diseases.
to be noxious
2.3. The Forms of the Time Pressure
Eremia unify under the 'time pressure' phrase the folowing factors with senectogen character:
thermic agitation of molecules wich implement the structure of life.
fotonic and corpuscular bombardment caming under the form of environmental radiations.
interconnection of macromolecular chains, in special of proteins and nucleus acids, wich is the chemical reaction wich generate the most ample noxious efect, starting from the most lower level chemical interaction.
2.4. Explanatory-Theoretic Aspects of Senecence
In his 'An attempt at a rational clasification of theories of aging', Medvedev estimated the number of theories wich explain aging to approximately three hundred. This is a part of them(cf. Eremia):
1. Theories of genetical program
1.1. The hypothesis of morphogenetic active program- wich release the death of animal at short time after the end of reproduction act (at species as somon, marsupial mouse etc.) or at short time after certain modifications of environmental properties (day shortening, drought etc.).
1.2. The hypothesis of postreproductive suicide program - most often by non-feeding ( at some insects, nematods etc.).
1.3. The hypotheses of morphogenetical passive aging:
1.3.0.The hypothesis of aging as a continuation of differentiation, as a supradifferentiation or as a increase of genes repression.
1.3.1. The hypothesis of aging as a disdifferentiation with genes repression disappearance and disregulation of sequential transcription.
1.3.2.The hypothesis of aging as an efect of incomplete repression of development program.
1.4.The hypotheses of the existence of some specific or non-specific genes of senescence.
1.4.0.The hypothesis of non-balance between mutator and antimutator genes action.
1.4.1. The hypothesis of some pleiotropic genes wich act in the late life.
1.4.2. The hypothesis of the programmed synthesis of some mitotic inhibitors or of some inhibitors of transcription and translation.
1.4.3. The hypothesis of some mutations wich accellerate aging (theories inspirated from human the sindroms of premature aging).
1.5. The hypotheses of the existence of some longevity specific genes.
1.5.0. Hypotheses based on the identification of some genes wich extend the life of some inferior eukariotes.
1.5.1. Hypotheses wich explain the human superior longevity comparatively with the primates by some additional genes that have humans.
1.5.2. Hypotheses wich have as starting point the identification of mammals longevity genes with the help of selection by hibridization.
1.5.3. Hypothesis of the existence of some genetical programs for correction wich are released only in germinal cells.
1.6. Hypotheses about the existence of some biological clocks .
1.6.0. Hypothesis of the existence of temporal genes, hypothesis of gradual loss of temporal organization, hypotheses based on the connections between senescence and biorhythms.
1.6.1. Hypothesis of DNA shortening in postmitotical cells.
1.6.2. Hypothesis of DNA repetitive sequences methylation.
1.6.3. Hypothesis of limited potential of cellular divisions.
1.6.4. Hypothesis of the cellular 'capitulation'.
1.6.5. Hypothesis about hipotalamic neuroendocrin centers.
2. Theories of the first lesions
2.0. Hypothesis of wear by work.
2.1. Hypothesis of autointoxication.
2.2. The Hypothesis of the suffocation by waste products.
2.3.The Hypothesis of calcification (calcifilaxiei).
2.4. The Hypotheses of the diminution of the co-ordination grade between the metabolic pathways.
2.5. The Hypothesis of the erors in the protein synthesis.
2.6. The Hypothesis of the secondary efects of the intermediar metabolits.
2.7. The theory of the free radicals.
2.8. The theory of the thermic microshocks.
2.9.The theory of somatic mutations.
2.10.The theory of entropy.
2.11. The theory of the deuterium accumulation.
2.12. The theory of the accumulation of some metabolits isomers.
2.13. The theory of the metallic ions accumulation.
2.14. The theory of the radiations senectogen efects.
2.15. Theories of lesions by stress.
3. Theories based on the analysis of senescence manifestations at the molecular, cellular and organic level
3.0.Theories of the structural stabilization and of the macromolecular intercconection.
3.1. Theories based on the calitative modifications of protein by post-translational causes.
3.2. Theories based on the cantitative changes of proteins.
3.3. Theories based on modifications in protein biosynthesis.
3.4. Theories based on modifications of structure of nucleus acids.
3.4.0. Hypothesis of DNA chain breakings.
3.4.1. Hypothesis of DNA metilation diminuation.
3.4.2. Hypothesis of metalic ions wich are connected with DNA.
3.4.3. Hypothesis of modifications in DNA proprocessing.
4. Evolutionary Theories
4.0. Theories of rate of living.
4.1. Theories based on the correlations between breeding rate and aging rate.
4.2. Theories based on the correlation between development lenght and rate of aging.
4.3. Theories based on the carrelations between body sizes and life span.
4.4. Theories based on the correlations between some modifications at molecular level and the life span.
4.5. Theories based on the correlations between some modifications at genetic level and rate of aging.
4.6. Theories based on the correlations between some modifications at celular level and longevity.
4.7. Theories based on the correlations between tisular regeneration performances or of celular proliferation and life span.
5. Theories of certain particular tissues aging
5.0. Theory of the colesterol in aterosclerosis.
5.1. Theory of the protein modification in cristalin aging.
5.2. Theory of eritrocites aging.
5.3. Theory of tooths wearing.
7. Unificatory Theories:
- wich try to combine elements from different groups of theories; for exemple, so called 'network theory of aging' elaborated by Kowald and Kirkwood in 1994, wich join the theory of erors with the theory of free radicals.
The problem wich is put in gerontology is that of distinction between efects and causes.The main question will be always the folowing:
is the incriminated modification really a first cause of senescence or is only the result of some emergent changes from a more fundamental level?([Hayflick, 1983]).
Eremia had affirmed that 'most gerontologists consider that senescence is, most probable, a multicauzal and multifactorial phenomenon, at wich realization take part many biophysical, biochemical and biological mechanisms. Each type of cell, tissue, organ or organism have its proper trajectory of aging. Cellular senescent processes are at the base of global phenomenon of aging, but they form, at the same time, the component elements of a an interactive superior hierachical network of wich integrity is deteriorated with time. There are senescent processes wich affect systems of different hierachical grades'([Eremia, p.126])[italics are of mine].
As we have seen before, in the Medvedev' rational classification, most theories of senescence indicated different factors with senectogen efect. It is possible that certain factors to be of non-first order. Then would be posible an explanatory reductionism at some first/final senectogen factors? But, the process of senescence is released only from the fundamental [physical, chemical] level towards macroscopic, tissular levels? There is no a bidirectionality? Psychical stress[at the sistemic, emergent, macroneronal level] would cannot affect senectogenly the individual cells level? Or the human etiological and therapeutic ignorance [I think at the power of present-day gerontology to eradicate senescence] would cannot take a place, as a condition, in a rational, complete explanation of human aging? We see that, the senescence conditions cannot be found in totatlity at an fundamental ontic[physical-chemical, atomic-molecular] level, because cognition and human ignorance are states wich depend on the dynamical interactions in the space phases of a cellular ensemble. Therefore, a complete explanation of senescence, wich have to expose all the conditions of senescence, cannot be a reductionistic one, because human ignorance is a cognitive insufficiency and conscious cognitive level is an emergent one. And, if psychical stress may influence the speed or the rate of aging, than again the reductive explanation is incomplete. Human conscience is not to be found at the singular intraneuronal level. On the other hand, senectogen factors can be both intrinsec[ for exemple, replicative senecence] and extrinsec [for exemple, reactive species of oxigen ROS], wich make havier the reduction of explanation to a singular factor with senectogen efect. On the other hand, if we would unify the previous theories clasificated by Medvedev and create the folowing reasoning:
T1 or T2 or or TN(N=aprox.300)
X is a human
X will become specifically old in a specific time, with a specific rate (sure, if it will not die because of certain accident or incurable disease/s)
we would make a non-valid reasoning, because, on the one hand,
we have not a demonstration of senescence eradication imposibility, on the other hand, a good explanation of human aging must to include all the causes of aging in order to justify all the efects/manifestations of aging. A single cause of aging that human body cannot neutralize it is sufficient to produce aging, but a different form af aging, a different rate of aging, a different longevity. But, there is a mea rate of human aging wich determ a mean human longevity.
And if the eradication of aging is not imposible, than aging is a contingent fenomenon and previous conclusion is not necesary, therefore the reasoning is non-valid. Us hope is that human aging can and will be eradicated, maximal minimized, or at least, very much minimized. If there are non-aging cells, like those wich are caled 'imortal'---but they can be destructed---, than aging, relativ to class of all living things, is not an universal and necesary phenomenon.
But, our reasoning is relative to human. Our present ignorance permite to us neither to eradicate aging nor to know if the prediction is necesary. If human aging is contingent, than in the explanation of the human actual non wanted aging, ignorance have necesarily a role to play, as a condition that permit. If human aging is non-necesary, even if for human its eradication will be for a long time or forever imposible, than the reasoning conclusion-prediction is non-necesary or contingent. And therefore, the reductive explanation of aging is incomplete. But, even if human aging would be ineradicable, the explanation of specific of human aging traiectory would require a consideration of human body arhitecture, of its structural and functional specificity. General cellular senescence would indiferently explain the aging of all mamals, but there are certain diferences wich cannot be explanated without refering to special structural or arhitectural conditions. On the other hand, now humans can modulate in some limits the rate of aging, and in this case the pro-longevive actions are initiated from a macrolevel. If we want an unificatory theory of aging, it must be a general theory or a disjuntive one; but, a theory wich unify all the theories of aging by a disjunction would unify factors wich are at diferent levels of organization. Aging also can be conceived as failure of systems, transbiogenically. From a philosophical point of view, wich tend to the absolute(necessary and sufficient conditions), these are good tendencies. Such general theory of aging would offer an most extense and rational understanding of aging. On the other hand, the most general=universal theory is the most minimal one. If we restrict our general theory of aging to the class of living things, than that theory should to refer to celullar processes, because the most simple living thing is a unicelullar. But, how much resemble, or how much relevance have the unicelullar senescence to the human senescence? Eremia have wrote that anemona, a pluricelular organism, do not age because it continuously replace its unicelullar parts. Some even have said that all unicelullar do not age, because they are imortal; in this case a biouniversal theory of aging is not posible. However, a general theory of aging can be general in another sense: it is general not relativ to all the living things but to all the things that are agingable or senescentable. And, if we conceive aging as transbioaging than that theory will be from an absolute perspective very good, but from a perspective wich quest for a complete explanation of human aging will be very minimal and insuficient. But, we must evaluate theories also from the point of view of solving the problem of eradication of human aging. It seem that a such general theory of aging would offer the most rational help toward creating a fundamental strategy for eradicating of human aging. But, a general theory of aging cannot substantiate a complete explanation of human aging; and, if that theory cannot justify all the aspects of human aging, than the strategy wich is based on it cannot lead to eradicating of human aging. On the other hand, those laws of nature, like termodynamics laws, that explain the failure of nonliving things, cannot explain or are quasi-irelevant for explanation of living things. Living things cannot leave in state of minimal entropy(Oexle). If the laws of nature that explain the progressive deterioration of non-living things are truthly irrelevant to the explanation of the aging of living things, than can be a general theory of aging? If the answer is yes, in what sense? A such theory must be a covery theory, not general. It must must to refer at a formal generality, or formal abstractivity. We must to conceive the general concept or idea of aging as an progressive, cumulative process of deterioration wich can be initiated both from the inside and the outside of body. The form of senescence traiectory of diverse objects, or the their senescence rates are not identical but similar. Those characters of process of aging that are proper only to living things, like noxiousness or the diminuation of biological performances, cannot be characteristics of the universal form aging. Only the progessiveness of a deterioration can constitue the universal form of aging.
Now I want to return to the previous reasoning-prediction-explanation. For the conclusion to form a necesary consequence, the premises must to form a sufficient condition. But, even if the theories from the first premise are all true, we dont know if they form or not form a complete causal explanation; sure, the causal explanation is not a complete explanation because it do not see the permissibility conditions of aging. And, it seem that the previous theories form a complete causal explanation of aging, but the premises of explanans are not sufficient to determine the conclusion as a necessary consequence-prediction. Because the conditions are not sufficient; explanans do not contain a explicit condition about the imposibility of eradication of aging. If the argument would contain a condition about the absolute imposibility of eradication of aging or about the imposibility to arrive at this result, by the progress of science, in a given period of time(in the life of X), than the prediction would folow with necessity. However, our reasoning was formed in an absolute form, in the conditions is not established a temporal interval. That global aging must correlate(Shurtz) or depend (Thalos) on endogenous(e.g., genetical, celullar, tisular carelates) and exogenous(e.g., physical and/or evolutionary conditions) senectogen corelates it is truth, but in order to a consequence to be necessary its condition/conditions must be sufficient. For Schurz, 'an explicit and complet answer to an explanation-seeking question ?P is formally a pair A = (Prem, Prem=>P)(for it
claims Prem to be true and Prem => P to be correct . Prem is the descriptive and Prem=>P the inferential part of A'(Schurz 1999).
In our case, the endogenous and exogenous correlates of aging can form Prem. And, this Prem implies P=aging phenomenon. But, there is a problem: even if the causal corpus from Prem is complete, the implication is relative. If Harnad was right when he said that physical laws are contingent, then there is no implication there. If the implication it holds only in the case in wich are excluded accidents or antiaging interventions than it is relative to some conditions. Should we add always some conditions to causes/correlates in Prem to sustain the ontological implication of Con?
2.5. Some philosophical Toughts on the explanation of aging
Human body, as a multicelular colony, is a part of whole univers; it neither can isolate itself from the univers nor can live in the outside of universe; for exemple, it need to inhale oxigen and to ingurgitate food from exterior. A living being wich would live eternaly by its proper energetical production would resemble with a perpetum mobile. But, the atempt to reduce/limited the explanation of aging at a physical process as entropy was criticated. In this sense, Oexle, a specialist, consider that ' Simple generalizing explanations of aging in terms of entropy are insufficient for the following reasons: i) Non-equilibrium entropy itself is not a simple concept. ii) The second law of thermodynamics does not demand that each temporal process has to be explained in terms of entropy. iii) Thermodynamic entropy must not be confused with informational entropies, i.e., complexity measures. iv) None of them is sufficient to explain biological organization. The same applies to the explanation of disorganization in aging. Indeed, both types of entropy may decrease with age. v) Theories that explain aging as a declining sequence of minimal entropy production states, are not well founded in thermodynamics. Organisms do not live in states of minimal entropy production. Declining entropy production is a consequence but not the cause of an age-dependent decline in metabolic activity. Aging is a function of self-maintenance which varies between species and was set by evolution but not by thermodynamic laws. vi) The effect of free energy availability on aging is not transmitted by entropy. vii) The overall entropy production of an organism indicates its activity, but is not a useful measure of efficiency. The P/O-ratio (rate of ADP phosphorylation per oxygen consumption) does not seem to decline significantly with age. viii) Aging involves all aspects of life. Neither life nor aging can be explained sufficiently by a single state parameter such as entropy. Minute changes in a regulatory part may cause large, positive or negative changes in entropy and entropy production of the entire system. ix) Bioenergetics, i.e., the research on regulation of and by free energy, should be fit into the framework of emergent properties of an organism. Then it will contribute to the understanding of aging'. And, I think that, even if the universal spatial background, the quasi-elementary physical properties, alltogether with micro an macro forces influence, would determine the fundamental laws of matter compositionality, and, therefore, would lie at base of all forms of posible material existence, and if microscopic events would lie at the base of macroscopic entropic processes, if entropy would have a fundamental influence toward deterioration of all microscopic existents, however explanation of a specific deterioration of certain class of existents, aging of living sistems, would involve also conditions related to their specific body arhitecture, and this would mean that, realy, entropy neither have a sufficient and may be neither a necessary role in the bioaging explanation. Appear the folowing question: 'really living organism cannot elude the process of entropy?' or 'have entropy a necessary senectogen efect/influence in every moment of life?' At least, at the age of breeding, it seem that entropy, in the sense of disorganization/disorder increasing, have not power; and than it is not a absolute inevitable fenomen; therefore the necessary condition of human aging must to be at a more specific level. The causes of human aging are both external(for, exemple, ROS) and internal (for exemple, replicative senescence). But wath about the posibility condition/conditions of aging. It seem that destructibility or perishability of human body is its first condition of aging, if aging is understuded as a progressive deterioration it is a kind of destruction. But this is also posibility condition of accidental death. May be this condition is too large or there are multiple conditions that only together form a aging posibility condition. However, human aging is not a simple or general form of progressive deterioration; it involve that some cells to arrive non-replicative stage, some cells must to acumulate certain substances(lipofuscin, neurofibrilary tangles, senile plaques and others), deterioration of certain pathways for signal transmission; the human aging is more than the sum of celular senescence, but the interneuronal pathways are also parts of body; human aging is not a simple deterioration of organization or is not just this, it is a progressive decrease of functional capacities wich may supervene not only on organizational deterioration(for exemple, lipofuscin acumulation or quantitative neuronal loss). A part of aging supervene on organizational deterioration and other parts can depend on a functional decrease wich is determinated not only of body microparts organization deterioration. We must to reduce death to a form of destruction: life destruction, at least at the whole body level. And, we must to reduce aging at a decrease process, it is a regressive unidirectional change of body. Aging is a specific change at a higher level wich may emerge/supervene on multiple microchanges, wich are not all of a deterioration character. Surely this change is a structural one, but this structural change not involve just deterioration, but also sediments acumulation(lipofuscin) or cantitative decrease(neuronal loss, or loss of viable cells). But, what make posible these emergent changes? On the one hand, the imperfection of body: absence of certain regenerative mechanisms [for anti(telomere shoretening)] , the insufficience eficiency of some preventive, protective, reparative mechanisms(like those again ROS attack, wich are antioxidant substances like: tocoferols, SOD, ascorbic acid), the absecence of some mechanisms for elimination of certain substances(lipofuscin) wich acumulate continuosly in body, and on the other hand certain cognitive imperfection/insufficience. We know about a reduction/regresion of hormonal(testosterone, DHEA, melatonin)production in aging, but wath are its causes and wath are its condition of posibility? In other cases we know about the inexistence of some mechanism for regulation of some processes (e.g., celullar senescence, apopthosis, arteries calcification([Judit, 2003; Wick et al 2003]) of wich action is senectogen on long term. But, is the eradication of aging problem suitable to be solutionated at the genetic level? I dont belive. The solution of this problem involve thinking and cooperation of some researchers, conscious inteligences. However, brain arhitecture specificity is partial geneticaly determinated ([Delacour 1998]), and therefore, certain cognitive capacities( like thinking power) and their limits are at least partial geneticaly predestinated, but not forever and the solution to the aging eradication is not inborn.' In the nature/nurture debate that still pervade neuroscience, Gazzaniga argues in favor of nature, by emphasizing that nurture alone is not enough to shape brain function. He advocates a prominent role for modularity, adaptive specialization and genetically driven mechanisms in the ontogenetic/phylogenetic development of the brain'(Teixeira 1998). However, I think that the most general behavioural actions and attitudes of individual life form have formed a specialzation; this specialization maybe
have determined a minimal change at the genetic level; maybe some genetical changes due to continuosly learning have accumulated very slowly until the apparition ofspecies. Both genetic factors and nurture factors should be involved in the explanation of human mind development. But, with regard to ontogenetic development of mind, I agreed with Quartz and Sejnowsky: 'learning is a dynamic interaction between a changing, structured environment and neural mechanisms. The neural machinery is extensively shaped by activity stemming from the environment, while its intrinsic properties also constrain this modulation and play an indispensable role in shaping the resulting structures '( Quartz, S. & Sejnowski, T.J., 1997). I think that, something from this structures can be genetically transmited.
The solution to the problem of eradication of aging, wich is one of the main provocation of human mind, require the more efficient and the more rapid, intermediation of human brain cognitive capacities. I tend to belive and hope that, the imperfection of antisenectogen biological mechanisms of human body or the absence of certain compensatory means for its imperfection have as a condition of posibility the present human ignorance; I tend to reduce the aging posibility condition to some insufficience of mind's cognitive states. I believe that we age and die because of foolishness. Human organism was not designed by a conscious inteligence, like a race car. There is no an external entity wich is call evolution or natural selection wich act as a physical force on the living organisms. However, there was and there is a fight for survival, reproduction, adaptation, domination, fame, by force, deceptive conditioning or by a subtle psychological coercition. Adaptation have not an independent of context value, it have value only when is necessary for survival or for progress. Progress itself is required only when is necessary for something, at least for happiness. The previous problems can be solved in multiple ways, wich had maded posible the appearance of certain habits-specializations-specifications wich later have genetically preserved.
If certain species have survived until now, this mean that they have some capacities wich, on the one hand, advantage their survival posibility, on the other hand, advantage them much more in solving of some fundamental problems(for exemple, reproduction, adaptation, control and manipulation of minds, comunication, social organization and orhers). Nobody have selected these capacities, but they had advantaged much more some species wich consequently have imposed themselves in number, fight, adaptation, reproduction etc. May be, the most important value-capacity for evolution is inteligence, and the diferences are gradually. Why isn't body endowed with mechanisms wich to permite it to remain forever young? Because in late life there is no fight or interest for imortality or for non-aging? Not at all.
I consider that apoptosis and celular senescence are not present in human organism because they have positively selected by evolution or by nature due to their positive or negative efects, but because their negative efects do not make imposible their life and because organisms that experience them can reproduce themselves, have not superior competitors and not in least measure due human insufficience inteligence.
Why there is celular senescence and apoptosis? Why exist aging? Supporters of evolutionary theory of aging propose the concept of antagonistic pleiotropy for explanation of aging origin. In conformity with evolutionary theories (Williams 1954), senecence is geneticaly predeterminated and senescence efectors genes was selected by evolution, by an accidental process nondirectionted toward aging per se, because, on the one hand, they advantage their reproductive activity, on the other hand, the force of natural selection decrease after the post-reproductive age. Therefore, in conformity evolutionary theories, the root-cause of aging is natural selection, that is selection resulted after the fight, competition, for survival and for the extension of terrestrial regions domains and of alternative species. This fight had as a consequence the disparition of some non-senescent species, though it is not know evidence that would be ever existed superior species, like mammals, non-senescent, and about fact that they would dominated by the senecent species. But, there exist also thinkers wich think differently. Thus, Clark conider that recent genetic analysis about the senescence fundamental mechanisms, and of genes wich underdetermine them, are remarcably similar in every eukariot organism studied, wich is hardly consistent with an independ acumulation of mutations with harmful character in late life of eukariots evolutionary history. Clark propose, in the place of gradualy accidentaly accumulation though the big periods of time, the thesis in conformity with wich almost every genetic elements of senescence--- genes wich determine senescence(senescence effector genes) and those wich it opose to their efects (senescence resistor genes)---have been established after short time, or in some cases even before, the eukariots emergency from their prokariots antecestors and was preserved by subsequent evolution. Clark assert that selection of this elements was guided by two radical new biological parameter wich define the eukariots life forms: endosymbiosis with oxigen-metabolizing prokariots, and use of sex for reproduction. However, there is autors wich consider that there are no senescence effector genes , but only genes that allow senescence appearance. Johnson (1988, cited in Perlmutter M. and Hall E., 1992) think that genes majority are involved in establishing of organisms longevitySuporters of evolutionary theory of aging have too litle succes in imagination of some proper mechanism by wich DNA to induce planned senescence([Eremia]).
3. Towards eradication of aging: A philosophical strategy
We should not to forget that that the final aim of gerontological research is a practical one: eradication of aging. In this sense, research must be guided, organizated toward realisation of this aim. But it is needed a first strategical idea concerning the realization or progression toward eradication of aging. I think that we can divide the aging posibility conditions in two sets:
those aging posibility conditions concerning imperfection of body'mechanisms for regeneration, prevention of lesions(for DNA and membrane damage due ROS etc.), or concerning the absence of some inerent mechanisms wich is also necessary for radical eliminaton of aging. We can call this conditions as aging first order posibility conditions.
and those conditions wich concern our ignorance about the all aspects of explanation of aging, or/and our insufficience cooperation, coordonation, organization of research toward aging eradication.
We need a very abstract, but necessary and sufficient to eradicate human aging, strategical principle.
I think that a posible strategy would can be grounded on the folowing pragmatic regulative principle:
Elimination of conditions of aging posibility implies eradication of the process of aging.
But, eradication of the condition of posibility of aging can be multiple realisable(e.g., freezer reduce efects of aging etc.).
From the set of all posible ways of eradication of all the conditions of posibility of aging we must to select only those ways wich do not stop life, if there are such ways.
We should to conceive the conditions of the posibility of aging in relations with the complet set of the fundamental causes of aging.
As an inteligible exemple, they are those mecanisms, factors, conditions, devices or something X wich permit to Y(fundamental causes of aging, e.g., ROS) to have an causal role, that is to determine Z(damages, sediments etc.).
As it was showed before, at the level of aging manifestations and causal factors there is a disconcertant diversity and complexity. Each cell type have its proper aging traiectory([Eremia 1997 ,p.126]). However, all cell types have their first origin in an one single egg cell. First egg cell divission generate a celular multiplicity. Each cell have a finit number of the same genes. By repression and expression certain genes differentiate the organism different susystems cells: nervous system's cells, muscle's cells, bone's cells etc. On the other hand, all celullar types [prokariots and eukariots] have ceratin common features: celullar membrane, DNA, cytoplasm, and ribosomes.
Even between human body's cells there are some similarities. For exemple, neurons have in common with other cells of human body some capacities or processes:
celular membrane.
nucleus.
genes.
cytoplasm.
mitochondria.
celular organeles.
protein synthesis.
energy production.
On the fundamental mechanisms of senescence, Eremia select the folowing theories:
theory of senescence as a result of genetic instability. But wath are the posibility conditions of genetic instability. It is posible somehow eliminate them? Or would be posible to repair the lesions of genetic level.
theory of senescence by somatic mutations.
theory of senescence as a result of the deregulation of transcription and translation processes. What are the posibility conditions of this deregulation. It is posible for us to control this regulation?
theory of senescence due acumulation of metabolic waste products.
theory of senescence by mitochondrial deterioration.
theory of senescence by water loss.
However, aging at the highest level, behavioural, depend on the aging of different organs; but it is posible that the aging of each organ depend not only on the its celullar senescence but also by the other organs aging; and the organ aging depend also by its quantity and its structural/functional/dynamical properties. That is, aging aspects are both general and specific.
Maybe, a strategical plan would towards eradication of aging have to start with
investigation of behavioural manifestations of aging, as age-dependent decline of cognitive performance, at the all organs and systems (CNS, muscular system, boned system, vascular sistem, digestive system, respiratory sytstem, imunitar system, reproductive system etc) level; Investigation of aging at celular, in general, is not enough, tough research of aging and its posibility conditions at general structural-functional celular patern is necessary, but is sufficient? There are some researchers that explain the decline of cognitive performance, as memory, not by loss of neuronal cells or by major deterioration of neuronal properties but by deterioration of certain signaling pathways; is organism more than cells? it maybe that pathways are not made of cells? This first step would make posible the next step.
establishing of aging causes at each level: the general causes of celular senescence, special causes of special cells senescence, the causes of aging at the organic or systemic level, the causes of aging at the intersystemic or interorganic level, causes of aging at behavioural level. Aging must to depend both of interdependence between organs, systems, and also on the specificity of cells, on the specificity of organ arhitectures, and on the certain posibility conditions. It is posible that at each level to be also posibility conditions of aging?
establishing of aging posibility conditions at each level where they exist.
eradication of aging posibility conditions at each level, in the limits of posibility.
Eradication of aging involve either perfecting of human body's structural-functional model or utilization of some therapeutic tactics to compensate, from outside, its imperfections. It is posible that elimination of aging manifestations to be multiple solvabile. My hope is that human wisdom and inteligence will succed, in final, to carry out one of the most loved dream of man: the dream of youth without old ageand of life without death.
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